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ABSTRACT
Recent debates about the concept of planetary boundaries recall longstanding
concerns about whether ecological limits are compatible with ecological
democracy. The planetary boundaries framework (originally set out in Rockström
et al., 2009a, 2009b) deﬁnes values for key Earth-system processes such as climate
change and biodiversity that aim to maintain a ‘safe’ distance from thresholds or
levels that could endanger human wellbeing. Despite having a signiﬁcant impact in
policy debates, the framework has been criticised as implying an expert-driven
approach to governing global environmental risks that lacks democratic legitimacy.
Drawing on research on deliberative democracy and the role of science in
democratic societies, we argue that planetary boundaries can be interpreted in
ways that remain consistent with democratic decision-making. We show how an
iterative, dialogical process to formulate planetary boundaries and negotiate
‘planetary targets’ could form the basis for a democratically legitimate division of
labour among experts, citizens and policy-makers in evaluating and responding to
Earth-system risks. Crucial to this division of evaluative labour is opening up space
for deliberative contestation about the value judgments inherent in collective
responses to Earth-system risks, while also safeguarding the ability of experts to
issue warnings about what they consider to be unacceptable risks.
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Is it possible to establish limits or boundaries that can contain humanity’s impact on the earth while ensuring
democratic legitimacy? This question speaks to two core challenges for research on ecological democracy:
understanding the extent to which democratic processes and environmental protection are mutually reinfor-
cing or in tension, and identifying ways of fostering synergies between them (see the Editorial for an overview
of the literature). Longstanding debates over ecological limits have attracted renewed attention with the emer-
gence of the concept of planetary boundaries. The term originates in research initiated by the Stockholm Resi-
lience Centre and other institutions that identiﬁed ‘control variables’ or parameters for nine key Earth-system
processes such as atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, biodiversity, ozone depletion and freshwater use
(Rockström et al., 2009b). For seven of those processes they proposed ‘boundary values’ for control variables, set
at a ‘safe’ distance from a global threshold or tipping point – such as the melting of polar ice sheets, triggering
multi-metre sea level rise – or more generally from a dangerous level (Rockström et al., 2009a, p. 32). Together,
these boundaries deﬁne a ‘safe operating space’ for the Earth system in which ‘humanity has the freedom to
pursue long-term social and economic development’ (Rockström et al., 2009a; for a revised version see
Steﬀen et al., 2015).1 The proponents of the framework warn that several of these boundaries had already
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been exceeded (see Steﬀen et al., 2015 for an updated version), and that humanity is at risk of transgressing
further boundaries unless societies transform the ways in which they extract, modify and consume the planet’s
ﬁnite resources.
Since its original publication, the idea of planetary boundaries has received widespread attention from pol-
icy-makers and institutions (see, e.g. OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2012; United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level
Panel on Global Sustainability, 2012), and has had signiﬁcant policy impact, at least at a rhetorical level. Never-
theless, the concept has also met with considerable resistance from some parts of the scientiﬁc and policy com-
munities. While planetary boundaries featured in several drafts of UN decisions on sustainable development,
ultimately the idea failed to be included in either the 2012 Rio + 20 outcome document or the 2030 Agenda
that launched the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 (SDGs; Schlosberg, 2016, p. 199).
An important critique of the framework is that it fails to account for the role of politics in setting collective
goals.2 One line of criticism is that the terminology of boundaries implies restricting opportunities for
economic growth and development for developing countries (Linnér and Selin, 2013; see also Schlosberg,
2016, pp. 198–199). However, governments have been willing to set multilateral targets associated with several
Earth system processes included in the planetary boundaries framework, such as limiting temperature rise or
reversing stratospheric ozone depletion (Galaz et al., 2012). This suggests that, even though states remain intent
on safeguarding their development aspirations, they are not altogether averse to setting coordinated constraints
on how their economies operate in the interests of environmental protection.
Our focus in this article is on a related but distinct line of criticism: that the planetary boundaries framework
is democratically problematic because it implies an expert-driven approach to global environmental governance
that sidelines the participation of citizens and the diverse values they hold (Pielke, 2013; Stirling, 2015).3 Those
drawing on literature on ecological democracy, deliberative democracy and Science and Technology Studies
(STS), we explore whether planetary boundaries could be deﬁned and institutionalised in democratically legit-
imate ways. We argue that a democratic approach to planetary boundaries requires enhancing citizen partici-
pation in evaluating Earth-system risks. Nevertheless, expert warnings can serve an important function in a
democratic conversation about those risks, provided that experts are transparent about the value judgments
inherent in those warnings. The article aims thereby to advance understanding of how ecological democracy
could be theorised and implemented at a global level, and to show how democratic principles and practices
could inform the science-policy interface for Earth system governance.
We begin by elaborating upon democratic critiques of planetary boundaries and outlining an analytical fra-
mework that articulates the relationships between planetary boundaries, ecological democracy and deliberative
democracy (Section 2). We then review four existing accounts of the role of experts in deliberation about values
(Section 3) before presenting a revised account of the division of evaluative labour between experts, citizens and
policy-makers that emphasises the need for iterative, dialogical deliberation over planetary boundaries and
‘planetary targets’ negotiated in policy settings (Section 4). Section 5 concludes with recommendations for
further research.
2. Planetary boundaries, ecological democracy and the science-policy interface
2.1. Democratic critiques of planetary boundaries
Leach (2013) sparked a robust debate by arguing that the idea of the Anthropocene,4 ‘with its associated con-
cepts of planetary boundaries […] is co-constructed with ideas of scientiﬁc authority and incontrovertible evi-
dence; with the closing down of uncertainty or at least its reduction into clear, manageable risks and consensual
messages’ (see also Pielke, 2013 and Stirling 2015 for similar criticisms). Critics have ﬁxed upon claims that pla-
netary boundaries are ‘non-negotiable’ limits (Steﬀen, Rockström, and Costanza, 2011), or ‘immutable facts
emerging from the bio-geophysics of planet earth’ that are ‘immune to political pressure’ (Chapron et al., 2017).
This critique – which we refer to as the ‘technocracy critique’ – speaks to broader debates in the ﬁelds of STS
(Jasanoﬀ, 2004; Lövbrand et al., 2011), democratic theory (Fischer, 2009) and philosophy of science (Kitcher,
2011) about how experts, policy-makers and citizens should interact to address collective problems. While
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technocratic critiques are evident in earlier debates about ecological limits to growth (Eastin et al., 2011), pla-
netary boundaries give rise to distinctive concerns due to a perception that they combine technocratic control
with centralisation of power at a global level. Debates about planetary boundaries raise questions about who
should have a say in what counts as a ‘safe’ or ‘dangerous’ operating space for humanity, and whether it is poss-
ible or even desirable to arrive at singular conclusions about these questions, given that exposure to danger and
risk perceptions may vary widely across communities for any speciﬁed boundary value (Shaw, 2013).
Despite eﬀorts to articulate how planetary boundaries can be compatible with principles of equity and jus-
tice (see, e.g. Raworth, 2017), there is little systematic analysis of whether planetary boundaries could be
deﬁned and institutionalised in a way that is democratically legitimate. Leach et al. (2013) suggest that
three D’s – direction, diversity and distribution – should be considered when formulating societal pathways
for staying within planetary boundaries at the same time as satisfying minimum requirements of social jus-
tice. While the authors recognise that debates about societal pathways ‘will need to be as open and inclusive
as possible’ and enable the voices of marginalised groups to be heard (p. 88), conspicuously missing is a
fourth D: democracy.
2.2. Planetary boundaries and ecological limits as value-laden boundary objects
Planetary boundaries are commonly viewed as a new variation on discourses of ecological, environmental or
biophysical limits (Meadowcroft, 2012). The planetary boundaries framework explicitly builds on previous
articulations of global and sub-global limits, including ‘limits to growth’, ‘critical loads’, ‘tolerable windows’
and ‘safe minimum standards’ (Rockström et al., 2009a). Importantly, ecological limits are not purely scientiﬁc
constructs but also involve normative decisions: ‘the idea of a limit involves setting a maximum level of damage
to a natural resource system that we are prepared to tolerate or accept’ (Haines-Young et al., 2006, p. v). What is
considered tolerable, acceptable or safe will depend on a range of normative or value judgments such as: the
intrinsic or instrumental value that society places on the system compared to other social goals; how society
values the wellbeing of the current generation compared to that of future generations; and social preferences
about risk aversion (Renn, 2008). Limits need not be ﬁxed in perpetuity but could vary over time along with
changes in social values as well as ecological dynamics.
The deﬁnition of planetary boundaries quoted in the Introduction comprises two main components. First,
planetary boundaries are deﬁned by their biophysical attributes, since they focus on thresholds at the global level
or sub-global thresholds that inﬂuence Earth system functioning. These attributes are ascertained through
scientiﬁc inquiry. Rockström et al. (2009a, p. 31) argue that ‘thresholds in key Earth System processes exist irre-
spective of peoples’ preferences, values, or compromises based on political and socioeconomic feasibility’. This
claim is valid to the extent that people’s values do not aﬀect the existence of the underlying biophysical
dynamics that give rise to threshold eﬀects. Nevertheless, even at the stage of understanding Earth system pro-
cesses, values come into play when there are multiple possible control variables or thresholds for a given pro-
cess. Thus the IPCC has recognised that ‘it is […] not possible to deﬁne a single critical threshold [for dangerous
climate change] without value judgments and without assumptions on how to aggregate current and future
costs and beneﬁts’ (Collins et al., 2013, p. 1107).
Second, planetary boundaries are deﬁned by their particular normative orientation or rationale, namely (i)
the perception of an unacceptable risk or danger to humanity as a consequence of the Earth system ‘tipping
over’ or shifting states, and correspondingly (ii) the need to ensure a ‘safe’ operating space worldwide. Even
with processes that have one or more clear thresholds (e.g. conversion of coral reefs to algal-dominated systems
as a result of ocean acidiﬁcation), value judgements cannot be avoided when setting boundaries around those
processes, as the question of how far a ‘safe’ distance from those points is involves irreducible normative choices
about levels of acceptable risk (Moellendorf, 2011). The role of normative judgments in setting boundary values
is even more apparent for biophysical processes that lack clear tipping points or thresholds (e.g. global biodi-
versity loss: Brook et al., 2013). Indeed, several originators of the proposal recognise that ‘the position of the
boundary is a normative judgment, informed by science but largely based on human perceptions of risk’
(Steﬀen, Rockström, & Costanza, 2011, p. 61).
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The fact that ecological limits contain an irreducible normative component means that deﬁning planetary
boundaries is a task that cannot be resolved by scientiﬁc expertise alone (unlike, say, identifying the temperature
at which an ice sheet will melt). Thus, planetary boundaries – along with ecological limits – are best understood
not as a purely scientiﬁc concept but rather as a ‘boundary object’, that is, ‘a set of arrangements that allow
diﬀerent actors to cooperate on a basic common understanding while keeping the diversity of their views’ (Bier-
mann, 2012, p. 6; Morseletto et al., 2017; see also Bowker & Star, 1999).
2.3. Ecological democracy, deliberative democracy and the division of evaluative labour
Theories of ecological democracy provide a helpful starting point for thinking about how value judgments
should enter into environmental decision-making processes, and whose values should count in these processes.
For Eckersley (2004, p. 243), ecological democracy requires that ‘all those potentially aﬀected by ecological risks
ought to have some meaningful opportunity to participate, or be represented, in the determination of policies or
decisions that may generate risks’. While theories of ecological democracy place a strong emphasis on pro-
cedural criteria (such as citizen participation) as sources of democratic legitimacy, they also seek to advance
substantive values, often understood as pro-environmental or ‘green’ outcomes. As outlined in the Editorial,
the procedural and substantive dimensions of ecological democracy may sometimes be mutually reinforcing
and at other times in tension.
Theories of ecological democracy commonly recognise that some forms of ecological limits are necessary
preconditions for the exercise of democracy itself (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 122). Thus, the core of the chal-
lenge is not whether ecological limits are compatible with ecological democracy in principle; it is whether demo-
cratic processes can deal with situations where people hold conﬂicting views on the substantive question of how
stringent those limits should be. It is on these questions that theories of deliberative democracy can provide
valuable guidance.
For theorists of deliberative democracy, democratic legitimacy requires that those who are aﬀected by a
decision have the opportunity to participate, or be represented in, deliberation that substantially inﬂuences
the decision (Dryzek, 2010, p. 3).5 Deliberative democracy is one of the most prominent theoretical perspectives
for approaching ecological democracy: it argues that deliberation can secure procedural values while also
increasing the value that participants place on shared substantive interests such as environmental protection
(Smith, 2003; Dryzek, 2013). Deliberative democracy has opened up fertile ground for conceptualising global
democracy in terms other than those based on electoral models, which are widespread at the domestic level but
can less readily be scaled up to the global level (Baber & Bartlett, 2015; Editorial). In addition, a deliberative
conception of legitimacy can clarify how individual citizens and organised civil society (for simplicity both
are referred to together as ‘civil society’, while noting their diﬀerences), policy-makers (whether elected repre-
sentatives or bureaucrats) and experts should relate to one another in a democratic polity under conditions of
epistemic uncertainty and divergent values, and thus to construct an appropriate ‘division of labour’ among
them (Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 13; Klinke and Renn, 2014).
Establishing a democratically legitimate division of labour between experts, policy-makers and civil society
will involve (among other things) building relationships of oversight and accountability while ensuring that
experts have suﬃcient independence to minimise risks of ideologically motivated interference (Kitcher,
2011). However, our main concern here is with the division of ‘evaluative’ labour, i.e. the evaluation of evidence
with a view to forming governance responses, as distinct from other kinds of labour such as the production or
dissemination of new knowledge or the design of policy instruments. In the present context, the focus of eva-
luative labour is on the assessment of environmental (and speciﬁcally Earth system) risks and how to respond to
them.
As with related research in Science and Technology Studies and the philosophy of science (e.g. Durant,
2011; Pielke, 2007; Kitcher, 2011), deliberative accounts generally view the science-policy interface not as a lin-
ear process whereby experts transmit scientiﬁc ﬁndings to policy-makers but rather as an iterative, dialogical
process of engagement between policy-makers and experts (Edenhofer and Kowarsch 2015; Berg and Lindskog,
2018). The high regard that deliberative theories have for dialogue based on reasoning and reciprocal
4 J. PICKERING AND Å. PERSSON
justiﬁcation of claims means that expert knowledge has an important role to play in informing democratic
decision-making (Christiano, 2012; Fischer, 2009). Equally, citizens have a vital role not only in providing
local and other forms of knowledge that may not be held by experts, but also in ensuring that decisions are
responsive to their own values and preferences (Brown, 2016, p. 493; Mansbridge, et al., 2012, pp. 14–15).
Importantly, this does not mean that all the evaluative labour should be performed by civil society and pol-
icy-makers alone. Values play an important role in scientiﬁc practice by: inﬂuencing which lines of inquiry to
pursue; informing standards for evaluating the quality of scientiﬁc work; and identifying societal implications of
scientiﬁc ﬁndings (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015; Kitcher, 2011). Moreover, as we outline in Section 3, expert
advice to policy-makers may – subject to certain provisos – legitimately draw on experts’ own normative values
as well as on evidence about social values. Nuanced accounts of deliberative democracy stress that citizens’
values may be transformed through interaction with experts as well as fellow citizens (Baber and Bartlett,
2005; Dryzek, 2010), and the same holds for experts’ values. However, there remains a need for greater precision
about how this interaction should function. We turn to this issue next.
3. Accounts of the roles of experts and policy-makers in deliberating over values
In this section, we compare four accounts of the division of evaluative labour between experts, policy-makers
and civil society and show why each needs to be modiﬁed or supplemented to arrive at an account of planetary
boundaries that satisﬁes principles of democratic legitimacy.
3.1. Referees and players
We begin with a metaphor adopted by some of the proponents of the planetary boundaries framework:
[u]ltimately, there will need to be an institution (or institutions) operating, with authority, above the level of individual
countries to ensure that the planetary boundaries are respected. In eﬀect, such an institution, acting on behalf of humanity
as a whole, would be the ultimate arbiter of the myriad trade-oﬀs that need to be managed as nations and groups of people
jockey for economic and social advantage. It would, in essence, become the global referee on the planetary playing ﬁeld.
(Steﬀen, Rockström, and Costanza, 2011)
While the playing ﬁeld metaphor does not explicitly ascribe a role to experts, there is a clear implication that
expert knowledge about boundaries is crucial in setting the ‘rules of the game’, and that experts would have an
active role in any refereeing institution. Accordingly, critics such as Pielke (2013) have cited the metaphor to
support their view that the framework implies an attempted ‘power grab’ whereby experts seek to institutiona-
lise and enforce the boundaries through ‘top-down’, centralised global governance.
The account of Steﬀen et al. is compatible with the idea that societies (and the international community col-
lectively) remain free to choose whether they want to appoint a referee at all, and if so on what terms – such an
arrangement would not simply be imposed from above – but the metaphor is ultimately too constraining as it
sheds little light on how experts and societies might interact in deciding the rules of the game.
A related concern about some accounts of planetary boundaries is the implicit assumption that expert
authority over boundary-setting is permissible because it still leaves societies free to choose diﬀerent pathways
for sustainable development (see, e.g. Rockström et al., 2009a, p. 5). While there are indeed many possible
development options that could be chosen within the ‘safe operating space’, this assumption tends to down-
play the political and distributive dimensions of boundary-setting. Value conﬂicts in global environmental
governance are often starkest in issues related to burden-sharing, namely how countries should distribute
the collective eﬀort of achieving a given ecological limit or target (see, e.g. Holz et al., 2018). But value judg-
ments about distributional fairness, justice and inequality also feature in debates over how stringent the glo-
bal limits themselves should be, not least because a higher or lower limit may aﬀect some regions more than
others. For example, a shift from 1.5°C to 2°C of global temperature rise (i.e. from the more stringent to the
less stringent of the targets contained in the Paris Agreement) is likely to have severer eﬀects on low-income
countries than on wealthier countries (King and Harrington, 2018). Accordingly, a more nuanced division of
labour is needed.
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3.2. Mapmakers and navigators
Amore fruitful account than the distinction between referees and players is oﬀered by Edenhofer and Kowarsch
(2015). They portray experts as ‘mapmakers’ who chart a range of possible societal pathways or scenarios based
on diﬀerent values, technological choices and policy instruments. Societies are then viewed as ‘navigators’
among the diﬀerent pathways. Edenhofer and Kowarsch acknowledge that the exercise of mapmaking is not
value-free, especially because value judgments are required to determine which policy options should be left
oﬀ the map (e.g. if they are undesirable or unfeasible). But a key element of their account is that mapmaking
involves outlining a variety of options informed by multiple value orientations, rather than prescribing a single
policy option based on only one set of values. Applying this account to the planetary boundaries framework,
scientists would map the risks associated with diﬀerent boundary values, then leave it to society more broadly
to chart its own course by deciding which of those alternative boundary values it wishes to adopt (e.g. which
goal would be chosen for avoiding dangerous temperature rise).
In some respects the planetary boundaries framework represents a more ‘hands-oﬀ’, policy-neutral approach
to mapmaking than that adopted by global knowledge assessment bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) in dealing with individual boundaries, in that the framework does not specify which
policy options for staying within the boundaries should be left on or oﬀ the map but leaves these choices to
wider society. Nevertheless, by recommending speciﬁc boundary values, the planetary boundaries framework
goes somewhat further in other respects than the map-making role outlined earlier. Speciﬁcally, planetary
boundaries are based on value judgments made by the framework’s proponents about what they consider to
be an unacceptable level of risk (although, as outlined in Section 3.4, those judgments were based on a trans-
parent evaluative benchmark). This highlights the need to consider whether a more expansive role for experts
beyond mapmaking could be justiﬁed.
3.3. Honest brokers and issue advocates
On policy issues where values are contested, Pielke (2007, p. 142) emphasises the importance of experts – par-
ticularly those working through independent assessment bodies – as ‘honest brokers of policy alternatives’, a
role that bears a strong resemblance to that of the ‘mapmaker’. Nevertheless, he argues that scientists may legiti-
mately advance speciﬁc policy recommendations based on their expertise, thus acting as ‘issue advocates’, as
long as they are transparent about the values underpinning their recommendations (p. 7). Pielke bases this
view on the observation that, in addition to their professional role, experts are also citizens with their own per-
sonal values (p. 32, 147). Recognising these values does not confer upon experts a unique kind of moral auth-
ority or insight that citizens lack. Nevertheless, experts’ risk warnings may make a distinctive contribution to
public debate because (i) experts’ normative judgments may be less tainted by partisanship or self-interest than
other participants in debate (e.g. national governments and businesses); and (ii) even if citizens likewise have a
capacity for impartial reasoning, the cogency of risk warnings depends not only on the persuasiveness of one’s
normative convictions but also on an ability to interpret empirical evidence about the risks in question that may
be less accessible to lay citizens.
Pielke’s account of issue advocacy nevertheless remains limited, because he appears to envisage situations
where experts align themselves with a political cause and he treats experts’ values as personal and relatively
static, whereas there may be other ways in which experts can integrate social value judgments with scientiﬁc
knowledge and revise those judgments through deliberation, as we outline in subsequent sections.
3.4. Experts as risk advisers
A risk governance perspective can yield further insights on an appropriate division of evaluative labour. Klinke
and Renn (2014) emphasise the importance of expert involvement in risk estimation, which includes empirical
questions such as assessing the probability that a risk will eventuate and its likely consequences. Even at this
stage, value judgments are inescapable on matters such as which categories of risk should be assessed, what
constitutes a non-trivial risk worthy of estimation, and how the severity of consequences should be assessed
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(Moellendorf, 2011; see also Renn 2008). Accordingly, Klinke and Renn (2014, p. 452) argue that risk esti-
mation needs to be an interdisciplinary process informed by social scientiﬁc evidence on public risk percep-
tions. Nonetheless, they see the normative evaluation of risks as the province of stakeholders and citizens,
and in this sense their account still resembles the mapmakers-and-navigators distinction outlined above.
The account we present here brings a risk governance perspective together with the preceding accounts to
argue that it is legitimate for experts to issue warnings about unacceptable risks (rather than just mapping a
range of options), subject to the proviso that they are transparent about the criteria they invoke to guide
their warnings. In this way, experts could function not only as descriptive mapmakers but also as risk advisers
or (to extend the cartographic analogy) ‘warning sign-posters’, in the sense that they may place warning signs at
what they perceive to be a safe distance from hazardous areas on the map. Raworth (2017, p. 49) invokes such
an image when she describes the process of deﬁning planetary boundaries as ‘equivalent to placing warning
signs upstream of a river’s treacherous but hidden waterfalls’.
Placing warning signs on the map of policy options could still be viewed as a kind of mapmaking, but it
involves more than describing the features of the landscape: a warning sign carries with it a prescription as
well (i.e. do not go over the waterfall/cross the planetary boundary). Whereas the mapmaker might set out
the risks associated with diﬀerent levels of temperature rise, the scientist as risk adviser might recommend
that a particular level of temperature rise be avoided, based on their empirical knowledge of Earth system pro-
cesses and their value judgments about unacceptable levels of risk. These prescriptions are non-binding: while
they constitute one interpretation of what level of risk should be considered unacceptable, society may, in fact,
be willing to accept a diﬀerent level of risk. In other words, the navigators remain free to ignore the warning and
choose a diﬀerent path.
Ensuring transparency in the placement of warning signs is crucial as a safeguard against what Pielke (2007)
calls ‘stealth issue advocacy’ (where experts voice political opinions under the guise of presenting purely scien-
tiﬁc ﬁndings), and also as a basis for further deliberation among experts, policy-makers and civil society. The
original version of the planetary boundaries proposal took what the proponents called ‘a conservative, risk-
averse approach to quantifying planetary boundaries’ and stipulated that, to remain within planetary bound-
aries, the Earth system processes included should remain within or return to conditions that prevailed in
the Holocene epoch, since those are the only conditions known to have accommodated large-scale human
development (Rockström et al., 2009b, p. 473; see also Steﬀen, Persson et al. 2011, p. 753). While the Holocene
baseline remains open to contestation (for a critique see Dryzek, 2016), it helps to provide a transparent basis
for further debate.
4. Remodelling the division of evaluative labour on planetary boundaries
Employing the account we have just outlined, we can now develop a more precise and nuanced model of how a
democratically legitimate division of labour on setting planetary boundaries could unfold through policy pro-
cesses and deliberative interactions between experts, policy-makers and civil society.
4.1. Planetary boundaries and planetary targets
Even allowing that scientists may act as risk advisers by proposing planetary boundaries, what are we to make of
the fact that international negotiations have already produced globally agreed ‘warning signs’ to help manage
risks to the Earth system, such as the 1.5°C or 2°C temperature targets in the Paris Agreement on climate
change? A simplistic account of this process might run as follows: experts set planetary boundaries; policy-
makers set targets that either follow or ignore advice from experts; and policy-makers and experts deliberate
over pathways for staying within those boundaries (see the ‘linear model’ in Figure 1). The preceding discussion
has shown that this model is untenable as it involves too strict a separation between expert boundary-setting
processes and social values.
An alternative approach would be to view planetary boundaries as a single boundary object, with experts,
policy-makers and civil society each setting out their own visions of planetary boundaries, either jointly or in
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parallel (see the ‘unitary iterative model’ in Figure 1). However, a unitary model that focuses on co-producing
a single kind of object could conﬂate distinct forms of deliberative practice. For example, in contrast to the
process of formulating the original planetary boundaries proposal, the process of negotiating the Paris Agree-
ment’s temperature targets was far more clearly shaped by broader political considerations, including what
developed and developing countries could accept as a reasonable balance between environmental and econ-
omic objectives, and the need to craft a target that could be readily understood by the public and motivate
further action. Society’s decisions about how to respond to Earth system risks involve weighing a broader
range of normative choices – including trade-oﬀs with eﬀorts to limit other kinds of societal risks (e.g.
armed conﬂict) or to pursue other kinds of public goods (e.g. basic education) given limited resources –
and it would be diﬃcult for even the most sophisticated account of planetary boundaries to take all these
considerations into account.
Figure 1. Models for deﬁning and institutionalising planetary boundaries.
Straight arrows represent linear ﬂows of communication, while circular arrows represent iterative dialogue. Shading of cells in models A-C shows planetary bound-
aries (dark grey), planetary/policy targets (medium grey) and policy pathways (light grey).The models are diﬀerentiated mainly at steps 3 and 4. We assume that steps
1 and 2 are scientiﬁc tasks undertaken primarily by experts.
Source: the authors.
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To develop a more nuanced division of labour we draw insights from Bäckstrand’s (2017) account of critical
loads for air pollution. Bäckstrand distinguishes between the task of setting critical loads – which remains pri-
marily a task for experts in dialogue with policy-makers and citizens – and that of setting target loads – which
represent the levels of air pollution that policy-makers view as acceptable and institutionalise in treaties and
other policy instruments (Bäckstrand, 2017, p. 132). Target loads may correspond with critical loads but
may also be more or less stringent. What makes the process of deﬁning target loads distinctive is that consider-
ations of political, technological and economic feasibility come into play more directly (Bäckstrand, 2017,
p. 132).
The distinction between critical loads and target loads can inform our understanding of planetary bound-
aries by distinguishing between planetary boundaries as such – which are generated primarily through a process
of scientiﬁc inquiry informed by societal judgements about risk – and planetary targets produced through pol-
itical negotiations but informed by scientiﬁc eﬀorts to identify planetary boundaries.6 Planetary targets could
take multiple forms, including international treaties (such as the Paris Agreement), multilateral declarations
(such as the Sustainable Development Goals), commitments agreed by smaller ‘clubs’ of states, or proposals
advanced by civil society organisations (as with the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration target of 350
parts per million advocated by 350.org). This distinction is shown as the ‘diﬀerentiated iterative model’ in
Figure 1. All three groups (policy-makers, experts and citizens) retain important roles under both models,
but the planetary targets model gives a clearer articulation of the objects towards which the evaluative labour
of each group is directed.
Distinguishing planetary boundaries and targets may help to relieve pressure on scientists to second-guess
what kinds of boundary values might be viewed as politically acceptable in multilateral negotiations and may
reduce the likelihood of political interference in boundary-setting processes. Moreover, the distinction can aid
analytical clarity by making it possible to compare negotiated planetary targets with evolving understandings of
planetary boundaries. In this way, planetary boundaries can serve as benchmarks for evaluating planetary tar-
gets, thus functioning in a manner similar to ‘equity reference frameworks’ that can facilitate deliberation about
the fairness of national contributions to climate change mitigation (Holz et al., 2018).
4.2. Iterative deliberation about boundaries and targets
The ﬁnal step in our revised account is to show how eﬀorts to develop planetary boundaries and planetary tar-
gets need to be linked through iterative processes of deliberation. Diﬀerentiating planetary boundaries and pla-
netary targets does not imply recreating a rigid demarcation between science and politics, or continuing to
cordon oﬀ planetary boundaries as ‘non-negotiable’. As the shading in Figure 1 shows, both tasks are situated
on a spectrum that involves varying mixtures of knowledge about biophysical processes on the one hand and
normative or political judgements on the other. Accordingly, both tasks require iterative dialogue between
experts, policy-makers and civil society in two areas.
First, democratic legitimacy requires engagement between experts, civil society and policy-makers over pla-
netary boundary values. This could occur either through formally organised deliberative processes in which
experts, policy-makers and citizens exchange views face-to-face or through informal ‘extended peer commu-
nities’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) where scientiﬁc work on planetary boundaries is scrutinised in broader
scholarly and public debate. Deliberative engagement can help to produce boundary values that are robust
to societal perceptions about risks to the Earth system, both by testing experts’ normative assumptions
about unacceptable risks with a more diverse group, as well as by enabling citizens’ and policy-makers’
views to be better informed by empirical evidence about Earth system risks (Lo, 2013). Collaborative
approaches are necessary where individual Earth system scientists lack the expertise or resources to conduct
public opinion surveys or participatory exercises themselves (Kowarsch et al., 2016). Evidence from other
experts (including economists and ethicists) may also inform scientists’ judgments about risk (Kowarsch
and Edenhofer, 2016) and open up space for fruitful interdisciplinary contestation.
Second, in contrast to the linear model, which assumes that planetary boundaries are set (by experts) ﬁrst
and decisions about policy pathways come later, under the diﬀerentiated iterative model decisions about
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planetary boundaries, planetary targets and policy pathways are viewed as inter-related. As Edenhofer and
Kowarsch (2015, p. 303) point out, societal ends and the means to achieve them are interdependent, and societal
ends may need to be revised if the means to achieve them prove impossible. Accounts of planetary boundaries
that recognise the need to encompass multiple levels of governance have largely focused on downscaling pla-
netary boundaries to national or local levels and taking questions of social values into account at that stage (see,
e.g. Cole, Bailey, and New, 2014; Dearing et al., 2014). However, evidence about what should and can be done at
the local level – such as strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or conserve biodiversity – is crucial for
informing decisions about the desirability and feasibility of planetary targets. Accordingly, there is a need not
only for small-scale deliberative processes to clarify communities’ priorities for managing local and global risks,
but also for national and transnational deliberation that brings together citizens from diﬀerent localities and
countries to ‘upscale’ their preferences into international policy-making, and to identify and build areas of
shared understanding over how to respond to global risks (Dryzek and Pickering 2019). Political debate
about target values may also reveal changing societal perceptions of risk that could inform future assessments
of boundary values.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that the idea of planetary boundaries is compatible with a democratically legit-
imate approach to governing risks to the Earth system, even though some arguments put forward by its pro-
ponents (e.g. the referees and players analogy and the ‘non-negotiable’ nature of the boundaries) convey a more
technocratic view of relationships between experts and wider society. The division of evaluative labour we have
set out helps to respond to the technocracy critique by showing how planetary boundaries can be informed by
social values about unacceptable risks, and how planetary targets can be informed by scientiﬁc understanding of
the Earth system. A dialogical process between experts, policy-makers and civil society over planetary bound-
aries and planetary targets can reduce the likelihood that expert assessments of risk will be fundamentally at
odds with citizens’ preferences, while also opening up the possibility that citizens’ and experts’ perceptions
about risk may be transformed through deliberative processes.
Establishing the feasibility of democratising planetary boundaries is only an initial step; it does not guarantee
that any future boundary-setting eﬀorts will be democratically legitimate. Accordingly, further research could
build on the framework outlined here to: (i) evaluate the legitimacy of processes enacted to date for deﬁning
individual boundaries and targets in areas such as climate change, ozone layer depletion and biodiversity
loss; and (ii) identify institutional arrangements that could help to achieve a legitimate division of evaluative
labour in deﬁning planetary boundaries and targets.
The account we have given may help to inform broader debates about whether ecological limits and ecologi-
cal democracy can be reconciled. In this regard, Purdy (2015, p. 268) provides an apt perspective on the
relationship between these two ideas when he argues that the Anthropocene requires
a democracy capable of self-restraint. But, ironically, democratic self-restraint can come only from democratic self-assertion:
a political community must be able to act eﬀectively and decisively on hard questions in order to commit to accepting certain
limitations. The ultimate political challenge is to limit, together and legitimately, the scope of human appetites, so that we do
not exhaust and undo the living world. Our demands must have their boundaries.
Planetary boundaries can, in our view provide limits of this kind and, in doing so can help to build the foun-
dations for ecological democracy.
Notes
1. The Earth system refers to ‘Earth’s interacting physical, chemical, and biological processes. The system consists of the land,
oceans, atmosphere and poles. It includes the planet’s natural cycles – the carbon, water, nitrogen, phosphorus, sulphur and
other cycles – and deep Earth processes’ such as plate tectonics and volcanic activity (IGBP, 2017).
2. On critiques of the scientiﬁc basis for the planetary boundaries concept, which we do not discuss here in detail, see Brook
et al. (2013); Lewis (2012).
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3. In this article the term ‘experts’ refers not only to natural scientists but also to others recognised as having specialised knowl-
edge in a particular area, including researchers in the social sciences and humanities, and practitioners with legal or admin-
istrative expertise. All of these types of expertise may be relevant to debates about planetary boundaries, but within the
limited scope of the article, we focus primarily on the role of natural scientists, who have been the main proponents of
the framework.
4. The Anthropocene refers to the idea that the planet has entered a new geological epoch due to humanity’s pervasive inﬂu-
ence over the Earth system (Dryzek and Pickering, 2019; Steﬀen et al., 2011).
5. Deliberation refers to ‘debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants
are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants’ (Chambers,
2003, p. 309).
6. One could also envisage a further category of broad planetary goals (goals being understood here as ‘non-operational over-
arching objectives that usually require [quantiﬁed or numerical] targets in order to achieve them’: Morseletto et al., 2017,
p. 657). An example of a (de facto) planetary goal would be Sustainable Development Goal 13 (‘Take urgent action to com-
bat climate change and its impacts’).
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